Partition, the Old Aim
In December 1963 there was a more ominous reaction from the Turkish Government - the rebellion against the state launched by T.M.T. (the Turkish terrorist organisation in Cyprus), and threats of invasion and acts of aggression by Turkey itself, which used the President's proposals for amending the Constitution as an excuse for putting into effect her long-prepared plan for the partition of Cyprus.
The Vice-President publicly declared that the Republic of Cyprus had ceased to exist, and along with the three Turkish Cypriot Ministers, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House as well as the Turkish Cypriot civil servants, withdrew from the Government. On the false pretext that the Government of Cyprus and its forces were about to annihilate the Turkish Cypriot minority, the agents of Turkey in Cyprus, controlled by Turkish officers from Turkey, resorted to the forcible movement of sections of the Turkish Cypriot population, not for their protection as alleged at the time but in order to create compact Turkish areas and bring about a geographical separation of the Turkish minority from the Cypriot people. The Turkish contingent stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance, assisted the rebels by moving out of its barracks and illegally deploying in the northern part of Nicosia in hostile occupation of Cyprus territory.
That the underlying reason for obstructing the Constitution was to further Ankara's partitionist plans was openly admitted by the Turks themselves. Given below are some of their statements on the subject, together with press reports:
New York Times, 31.12.1963
Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk said today that the Cyprus Constitution no longer existed because these was "no possibility" of the Turkish and Greek communities living together on the island. Dr. Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, declared: "the Cyprus Constitution is dead".
New York Herald Tribune, 31.12.1963
"The Cyprus Constitution is dead", Dr. Kutchuk, the leader of the island Republic's Turkish community, told reporters. Asked if he wanted Cyprus partitioned between the Turkish minority and Greek majority, he replied: "Call it partition if you like".
Special News Bulletin, 5.1.1964 (issued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership)
Dr. Kutchuk: "I am a Vice-President elected by the Turks of Cyprus and I shall continue to perform my duties towards them. It is out of the question to collaborate any longer with a Government responsible"
It is worth noting that the agenda of the Council of Ministers was continuously sent to the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the Turkish Cypriot Ministers many months after the 1963 incidents, but they obstinately refused to attend the meetings in order to prove that the state no longer existed
Drawbacks of a Separatist System of Government
The T.M.T. leaders, at the instigation of Turkey, were all along trying to promote a "solution" to the problem aiming ultimately at the island's division. Proposals were put forward for direct partition or for federation envisaging removal of populations and the setting up of two distinct administrations for the purpose of creating separate national and racial areas.
The idea of federation in Cyprus was examined in 1956, when the island was still a British colony, by the eminent constitutional expert, Lord Radcliffe, who, in his "Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus", said the following on the subject: "It would be natural enough to accord to members of a federation equality of representation in the federal body, regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations of the territories they represent. But can Cyprus be organised as a federation in this way? I do not think so. There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities and apart from other objections, federation of communities which does not involve also federation of territories seems to me a very difficult constitutional form". The United Nations mediator, Dr. Galo Plaza, was of the same opinion. In his report he said:
"To my mind the objections raised (against federation) also on economic, social and moral grounds are in themselves serious obstacles to the proposition. It would seem to require a compulsory movement of the people concerned - many thousands on both sides - contrary to all enlightened principles of the present time, including those set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (S/62555, para. 153). "It is essential to be clear what this proposal implies. To refer to it simply as Federation is to oversimplify the matter. What is involved is not merely to establish a federal form of government but also to secure the geographical separation of the two communities. The establishment of a federal regime requires a territorial basis and this basis does not exist. In an earlier part of this report I explained the island-wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations. The events since December 1963 have not basically altered this characteristic: even the enclaves where numbers of Turkish Cypriots concentrated following the troubles are widely scattered over the island, while thousands of other Turkish Cypriots have remained in mixed villages" (S/62555, para 150). Elsewhere in his report Dr. Plaza stated: "In fact the arguments for the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government have not convinced me that it would not inevitably lead to partition" (S/62555 para. 154).
"Again if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction. I am reluctant to believe, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership claims, in the Impossibility of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots learning to live together again in peace. In those parts of the country where movement controls have been relaxed and tensions reduced they are already proving otherwise" (S/62555, para. 155).
London Conference
In January 1964, in view of the serious situation resulting from the fighting in Cyprus, the threats and acts of intervention and aggression from outside, and the forcible movement of population, the British Government convened a conference in London to deal with the problem. But a few days after the conference had started it became clear that its purpose was to persuade the Cyprus Government to agree a) to the dispatch to Cyprus of troops from various countries friendly and allied to Britain and Turkey for the ostensible purpose of maintaining law and order, and b) to the establishment of an inter government committee, with the participation of governments supplying contingents, to issue directives to the troops. Whatever might have been the motives and intentions of the various countries submitting that proposal, the representatives of Cyprus realised that acceptance of that proposal would inevitably result in the occupation of Cyprus by foreign troops and in the replacement of the authority of the Cyprus Government by that of the so-called intergovernmental committee, which would have made it easier for the Turks to pursue their plans for the geographical separation of the Turkish Cypriot minority. In fact, that was precisely what the Turkish representatives had demanded at the opening of the London Conference; but the representatives of Cyprus opposed that plan and all similar plans submitted to them, and the Cyprus Government finally brought the matter before the United Nations. To do so it had to resist pressure brought to bear from several quarters. At one point it had even been told that an appeal to the Security Council would be sufficient reason for Turkey to invade Cyprus. During the entire period the threat of a Turkish invasion was constant. Turkish military aircraft flew over Cyprus, and Turkish war equipment and trained officers clandestinely landed on the island. All this culminated in the bombing by Turkish jets of Cypriot villages and towns in August 1964. About 100 Greek Cypriots - mainly civilians - were killed and a large number were injured. Following Turkish threats to invade the island, the Cyprus Government brought the matter before the United Nations.
Turkish Aggression
Using as a pretext the coup of 15 July 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus allegedly as a "guarantor" of the island's independence but with the sole aim of destroying it. On 20 July 1974, 40.000 Turkish troops landed on the island assisted by Turkish air and naval forces, in violation of the U.N. Charter and all principles governing international relations as well as her own contractual obligations1. On 14 August, Turkey launched a second invasion in violation of the Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal, and of the agreements it signed at Geneva2. As a result, approximately 40% of the total territory of the Republic of Cyprus, which in economic terms is much more significant than its size (accounting for 70% of the economic potential), came under Turkish military occupation and about 40% of the total Greek Cypriot population was displaced. Moreover, thousands of people, including civilians, were killed or ill-treated and many more disappeared and are still missing3. Turkey also pursued a deliberate policy aimed at turkifying the occupied areas and at destroying the cultural heritage of Cyprus4
Recourse to General Assembly Session XXIX
During its 29th Session, in November 1974, the U.N. General Assembly adopted unanimously resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, and thus its implementation was made mandatory.
Turkey, however, although one of the countries voting for the resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 after recalling its previous resolution 365 (1974), regretted this unilateral action and affirmed that such action could in no way prejudge the final political settlement of the Cyprus problem. The resolution also called for the urgent and effective implementation of all parts and provisions of Security Council resolution 365 (1974). Turkey ignored this resolution and her own solemn undertakings once again. This Turkish move proved once more the insistence on the predetermined goal of Ankara for partition and eventual annexation
Partition Plans Furthered
In furtherance of its plans of partition, and in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its international obligations regarding respect for human rights and all relevant resolutions of the United Nations, which it has itself endorsed or voted for, Turkey organised on 8 June 1975, in collaboration with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, a "referendum" in the occupied part of the Republic. This so-called referendum is of course null and void. A referendum in an area where 80% of the population has been forcibly expelled by a foreign occupying country is inconceivable. According to basic theory and logic a referendum is a democratic process and not a tool for racial discrimination against the overwhelming majority of the population. This action is not only against the Greek Cypriots, who have been living in this island for thousands of years, but also against the real interests of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has been used by Turkey in the last decade or so as its tool against the independence of Cyprus. The provisions of the "constitution" of the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus are eloquent. In its preamble it claims that the "Turkish Cypriot community constitutes the inseparable part of the Great Turkish Nation". That the "constitution" aims at linking the occupied part with Turkey also becomes clear from the affirmation of the "members of the Assembly" to respect the "principles of Ataturk" and not the principles of the Constitution of Cyprus. It should be noted that the "constitution", in all relevant provisions, refers to the members of the Turkish Cypriot community as "Turkish citizens" so as to enable Turks from Turkey to colonise Cyprus without being distinguished from the indigenous Turkish population.
Another feature of the above "constitution" is the fact that all the enc-laved Greek Cypriots as well as the non-Turkish communities in the territory under occupation by Turkey are defined as "aliens". They are deprived of their fundamental human and political rights, and their rights are determined by a "special law" for "aliens". Moreover, the Greek Cypriots' right to ownership is not respected. On the contrary, the "constitution" contains provisions whose application presupposes the expropriation of property belonging to Greek Cypriot displaced persons, such as houses, fields, factories, hotels etc., and their allocation to Turkish Cypriots and Turks from Turkey. An outrageous act of the Turkish Cypriot leadership was also the enactment of a "law" for the distribution of Greek Cypriot property to the Turks.
The First Round of Talks
Turkey's tactics were also manifest in its attitude towards the inter-communal talks, held under the auspices of the then U.N. Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 362 (1975). Three rounds of talks were held in Vienna between 28 April and 3 May, 5 and 7 June, 31 July and 2 August 1975.1 The Turkish side followed delaying tactics and refused to put forward clear cut proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem, as her aim was the consolidation with the lapse of time of her position and the eventual turkification of the occupied territory. At the third round of the talks in Vienna the Turkish Cypriot negotiator agreed to submit comprehensive proposals before the next round, which was scheduled to take place in New York on 8 and 9 September 1975.
But the Turkish Cypriot side failed to submit the proposals it had promised and, in an attempt to turn world attention away from its commitments, continued instead to demand the establishment of a transitional government in an effort to deprive the Cyprus Government of its world recognition and deviate from the scheduled route of the negotiations.
Turkey also made it abundantly clear in New York that she was against any meaningful negotiations and tried to prolong the talks in order to consolidate the faits accomplis created through the use of armed force against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.
In view of the impasse created by the negative stand of the Turkish Cypriot side at the talks and Ankara's implementation of the colonisation plans, the Cyprus Government once again had recourse to the U.N. General Assembly. After hearing the views of the two sides, the General Assembly (R/3395) demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops without further delay.2
In putting forward its case before the United Nations the Cyprus Government expressed its desire that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots live together in peace as they had done for many years in the past, and enjoy the benefits of progress and prosperity in their country. Moreover it stressed that the forcible movement of Greek Cypriots and seizure of their properties were inhuman acts and would be to the detriment of both sides. The Cyprus Government also declared that past experience has taught that if a settlement is to last it should be under broad effective international guarantees. As late President Makarios emphasised in his address before the General Assembly, "in an independent, non-aligned Cyprus free from the threats of force and all outside interference, its people, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, can live together in harmony with mutual respect for their legitimate rights. In these circumstances there will be neither need nor purpose for the existence of any armies". The Cypriot President said further that "the Government of Cyprus supports a fully demilitarised state of Cyprus and to this end is prepared to disband completely its armed forces.
In December 1975 the U.N. Secretary-General told the Security Council that he would be in contact with the parties "with a view to the resumption of the talks at the earliest possible time".
Latest Developments
The new round of talks began on 26 October 1992 in New York and meetings between the U.N. Secretary-General and former President Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash took place until 11 November 1992 when the talks were adjourned to be resumed in March 1993. As the third round of UN - sponsored Cyprus peace talks ended in New York on 11 November, Secretary-General Boutros Ghali presented an 18-page document codifying the positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides on UN proposals for an overall Cyprus settlement.
Entitled "Summary of the current positions of the two sides in relation to the set of ideas" (S/24472), the U.N. paper is divided into three columns; the first two columns represent the positions of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, while in the third column the U.N. position is quoted as this appears in the relevant Resolution 789/92 on 24 November 1992. The main provisions of this Resolution refer to the confidence-building measures, and are given below:
(a) that, as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the set of ideas, the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be affected in the Republic of Cyprus;
(b) that the military authorities on each side cooperate with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;
(c) that, with a view to the implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at present under the control of UNFICYP be extended to include Varosha;
(d) that each side takes active measures to promote people - to - people contact between the two communities by reducing restrictions to the movement of persons across the Buffer Zone;
(e) that restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the Buffer Zone be reduced;
(f) that each side proposes bi-communal projects, for possible financing by lending and donor Governments as well as international institutions;
(g) that both sides commit themselves to the holding of a Cyprus-wide census under the auspices of the United Nations; and
(h) that both sides cooperate to enable the United Nations to undertake, in the relevant locations, feasibility studies (i) in connection with the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons who would be affected by the territorial adjustments as part of the overall agreement, and (ii) in connection with the program of economic development that would, as part of the overall agreement, benefit those persons who would resettle in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration;
Former President Vassiliou said the main elements of the resolution were very important for Cyprus's cause and helpful for the efforts made by the Greek Cypriot side for a solution. However, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has reacted angrily to Resolution 789 and threatened to resign if forced to sign a Cyprus settlement based on UN Security Council lines.
On 20 January, 1993, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution 789/92 and to co-operate with other interested parties for their immediate implementation. On February 28, Glafcos Clerides was sworn in as the fourth President of Cyprus. In his investiture speech the new President stressed that the policy of his Government will centre on the attainment of a viable solution through peaceful means, based on the U.N. Resolutions on Cyprus, the European principles, understanding of the fears and sensitivities of both communities and seeking effective guarantees through Cyprus's entry into the European community.
On March 30, 1993, the Secretary General met jointly with President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash at United Nations Headquarters. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the timing, modalities and preparations for the resumption of substantive, direct, negotiations. The two leaders expressed their willingness to resume the joint negotiations on 24 May, 1993, in New York. The joint negotiations were preceded by a preparatory process in which the representatives of the Secretary-General met in Nicosia with the leaders of the two communities. Meanwhile the Secretary-General has appointed Mr. Gustave Feissel, a U.N. aide involved in the U.N. peace negotiating process on Cyprus, as his Deputy Special Representative in Cyprus on 6 April, 1993.
Also on May 21, he appointed former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark as his Special Representative for Cyprus. Mr. Clark replaced Mr. Oscar Camilion. On May 24, a new round of U.N. sponsored Cyprus peace talks resumed in New York under the auspices of U.N. Secretary General. Mr. Ghali presented to the Cyprus President Mr. Glafcos Clerides and to the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash, three U.N. documents which included a series of confidence-building measures. These U.N. papers proposed the transfer of the fenced part of the Turkish occupied eastern coastal town of Famagusta to the U.N. administration, the re-opening of the Nicosia International Airport under U.N. control and the implementation of measures to boost inter-communal contacts in the island.
The Greek Cypriot side has accepted in principle the three U.N. documents, provided that no provisions were added that would have the effect, directly or indirectly of recognising the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Mr. Denktash, however, presented a series of unreasonable demands such as the recognition of an illegal airport and two ports in the occupied area of Cyprus, which were turned down by Mr. Clerides and the United Nations. The representatives of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council each made statements in specific support of the proposals related to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport and called for prompt acceptance of these proposals. Mr. Denktash reiterated his wish to undertake consultations in the occupied Nicosia and Ankara. On the explicit undertaking by Mr. Denktash that the purpose of his consultations would be to promote acceptance of the proposals on Varosha and the Nicosia International Airport, it was agreed that the joint meetings would resume no later than Monday 14 June, 1993.
However the Turkish Cypriot leader, following his usual stalling tactics stated in Ankara that he would not return to New York on June 14 to resume negotiations as agreed and expressed strong criticism of the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package, stating that he would be obliged to reject the package if pressed to give a positive or negative reply. The Secretary General in his report on his mission of good offices on Cyprus on 1 July, 1993, gives a full record of the events as these developed at the meeting regarding the confidence-building measures, which were held in New York in May and makes reference to all the stages in the formulation of the documents, the discussions held at the United Nations and the events that followed.
The Secretary-General repeats his statement of 12 June, that Mr. Denktash unilaterally failed to honour the agreement of 1 June on the confidence-building measures. He also expresses disappointment that, despite the assurances Mr. Denktash gave on 1 June in the presence of the President of the Security Council and the Representatives of the five Permanent Members, the Turkish side did not accept the documents on the confidence building measures and failed to honour the agreement of 1 June to resume the joint meetings on 14 June.
The Secretary-General warned that if we do not achieve an agreement on the package of confidence-building measures, the effort to seek an overall settlement to the Cyprus problem will suffer a major setback.
Moreover the U.N. Security Council adopted on 27 May with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (Pakistan) a resolution on the U.N. Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Council decided that, with effect from the next extension of UNFICYP's mandate on June 15, 1993, the force's costs which are not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the organisation under article 17 (2) of the U.N. Charter, namely through assessed contributions. Cyprus and Greece have increased their contributions to 18,5 million dollars and 6,5 million dollars, respectively, thus covering more than half of UNFICYP's annual expenses, amounting to 47 million dollars. According to the resolution, the Council will conduct a comprehensive reassessment of UNFICYP in December 1993, when the force's mandate will be examined, "including the implications of progress on confidence-building measures and towards a political settlement for the future of the force".
As a first step, the force should be restructured in accordance with the Secretary-General's report "with the addition of a limited number of observers for reconnaissance". Meanwhile Mr. Ghali, in his report (S/25912) on the United Nations operations in Cyprus on 9 June, 1993, outlined his views on UNFICYP and covered the whole spectrum of activities, functions and responsibilities undertaken by the force. He further recommended that the Council extends UNFICYP's mandate for a further six month period. The Security Council in his resolution 839/93 of 11 June, 1993, extended once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December, 1993. The Cyprus Government remains committed to a bi-communal federal solution to the Cyprus Problem without the presence of foreign troops and settlers, that would safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and fully protect and guarantee the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots. In a United Federal Republic the people of Cyprus both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be able to maximise the potential of their communities and share in prosperity and peace in a common future.
To be continued...
British rule lasted until 1960, when the island was declared an independent state, under the London-Zurich agreements. 
Ankara tried to justify the invasion as a peace operation aimed at establishing the constitutional order disturbed by the coup, but even after the restoration of such order and the return of President Makarios to the island in December 1974, the Turkish troops remained to back up the plans of Turkey to colonize Cyprus as a first step to annexation. Two hundred thousand Greek Cypriots, 40o% of the total Greek Cypriot population, were forced to leave their homes in the occupied area and were turned into refugees. The few thousands of Greek Cypriots who remained in their homes after the completion of the invasion were gradually forced through intimidation methods to leave their homes and move to the south.
In utter disregard of repeated U.N. resolutions calling for the respect of the independence - sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as well as the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory and the adoption of all practical measures to promote the effective implementation of the relevant resolutions, Turkey is continuing the occupation of 40% of Cyprus territory. 
